Communicative Rationality: a biosocial linguistic perspective

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In my Ph.D. research, I assume a metatheoretical position of inter and intradisciplinary interfaces (COSTA, 2007; COSTA and FELTES, 2010). Thus, I work with three interfaces: a *formal interface*, when dealing with the non-trivial and non-demonstrative deductive mechanism (rational rules); a cognitive interface, when dealing with mental states (set of implicated conclusions) (rational outputs); and a socio-communicative interface, when dealing with dialogic behavior (complex rational instance). According to this perspective, I assume rationality and language as a behavior, that is, I investigate a rational dialogic behavior related to propositional attitudes, such as: to believe and to desire, and to acts, such as: to make a decision and to inform an agreement. Dialogue, considering the Linguistic Theory of Dialogue (COSTA, 2004, 2012), is understood here as a *biosocial behavior*. Dialogues are taken as "instantiations of the natural tendency for communicative contact (expressed by the *principle of non-trivial connectivity – COSTA, 2004*) and of the tendency for relevant content-sharing (expressed by the *principle of relevance – SW, 1995*)" (DIAS, 2013). As a central property, I assume *the* expectation *of dialogic consistency* (DIAS, 2013).That is, it is *dialogically expected* to have a *logico-communicative consistency* among *beliefs, statements, decision-makings and actions* (DIAS, 2012, 2013). This expectation is compatible with the Relevance Principle, since taking it accessible we can *predict* behavior (rationally), resulting in considerable benefit. In this scenario, *what is meant* is a set of assumptions that can be different from the set of assumptions regarding *what is communicated*, with no establishment of a mutual cognitive environment (assumptions that are made manifest for both dialoguers). That is the point in the identification of intentions (by a cost-benefit calculation), resulting in conceptual adjustment and coordination of behavior. Revisiting Relevance Theory, I assume that every *act of communication* creates a presumption of relevance. So, instead of the question *what does it mean?*, this work is

interested in the question *what does the dialoguer mean?*, clearly concerned with ostensive communication. Ultimately, this work points out that we communicate 'thoughts' by means of utterances in a dialogic context governed by cognitive patterns and basic formal structures. By means of dialogues, the agent has the force of the existing information changed, since each assumption has impact over the role system, following a postulate of Relevance Theory: a positive cognitive benefit is the one that add assumptions or change the strength of assumptions in the system.